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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between antitrust policy and information was 
traditionally concerned with oral or written communications that had 
anticompetitive potential, mainly because they furthered collusion or 
market exclusion.1 Among the most difficult problems was interpreting 
                                                                                                                     
 * This Article was prepared as the basis for the 2016 Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in 
Law at the Fredric G. Levin College of Law, University of Florida, on April 8, 2016. 
 ** Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, Law and History, University of Iowa. 
 1. See, e.g., Associated Container Transp. (Austl.) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 55–
56 (2d Cir. 1983) (focusing on communications between companies accused of exclusionary 
tactics). 
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the significance of communications that could be construed as either 
threats or offers to collude, or as facilitators of collusion.2 On the one 
hand, markets profit greatly from the free flow of information.3 On the 
other, particular uses of information threaten competition when they 
enable firms to coordinate price, output, or innovation.4 
Of course, explicit price fixing is a use of information but so are 
various cartel-facilitating practices that depend on publicizing one’s price 
or output. As a result, the way information is communicated has been a 
factor in merger analysis, particularly when the fear is that the merger 
might facilitate collusion.5 A recent example of this concern is In re 
LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation,6 which 
includes claims that banks used misreporting about interest rates as a 
device for manipulating them.7 U.S. courts have also confronted 
complaints that companies were exchanging wage and salary information 
to suppress or fix wages at an artificially high level. Individuals from 
numerous industries have made such claims, ranging from petroleum 
geologists,8 to high technology Silicon Valley employees,9 to law 
professors.10 
Prior to the 1980s, “information” in antitrust enforcement meant 
mainly print media, radio, television, film, and audio recording. All were 
involved in antitrust disputes at one time or another, and the challenged 
practices ran the entire gamut of U.S. antitrust law—from vertical 
integration and exclusion in the 1948 United States v. Paramount 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1417–1419 (on 
communications among competing sellers and offers to collude); William H. Page, 
Communication and Concerted Action, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405 (2007) (similar). 
 3. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. 
L. 607, 607 (2003).  
 4. See 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2020 (3d ed. 2012) (describing price 
fixing and related practices); LOUIS KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING 219, 221 
(2013); Page, supra note 2, at 412; William H. Page, The Gary Dinners and the Meaning of 
Concerted Action, 62 SMU L. REV. 597, 607–10 (2009).  
 5. 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 914, 942–944 (4th 
ed. 2016) (forthcoming). 
 6. 935 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 7. Id. at 679. 
 8. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2001), cause transferred by In re 
Comp. of Managerial, Prof’l & Tech. Emps. Antitrust Litig., 206 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (J.P.M.L. 
2002).  
 9. In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108–09 (N.D. Cal. 2012).  
 10. United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 436 (D.D.C. 1996), modified, 135 F. 
Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2001), and modified, No. 95-1211, 2001 WL 514376 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2001) 
(settling an antitrust case against the American Bar Association for tying law school accreditation 
to faculty salaries). 
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Pictures, Inc.11 case, to unilateral refusal to deal in Lorain Journal Co. v. 
United States,12 to a series of newspaper mergers and the passage of the 
Newspaper Preservation Act in 1970 to protect newspaper production 
joint ventures.13 In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,14 the 
Supreme Court refused to condemn a government-challenged tying 
arrangement in the newspaper publishing industry, exonerating a New 
Orleans newspaper publishing company’s practice of requiring that the 
same classified advertisements be run in its morning and evening 
editions.15 Finally, the Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc.16 decision rejected an antitrust challenge and, in the process, 
acknowledged the value of nonexclusive, blanket copyright licenses for 
recorded music.17 
Information also plays an important role in competition policy in the 
regulated industries, mainly because agencies depend on accurate 
information typically supplied by the regulated firms. As a result, 
misreporting one’s own market position can serve to exclude a rival or 
become a device for collusion.18 Or, in patent law, exaggerated claims 
about the validity or strength of one’s own patents can become a potent 
exclusion device.19 
All of these issues concerning the relationship between competition 
policy and information remain today. Many are more important than ever 
given the ubiquity of information and the speed at which it travels. 
This Article considers a related but nevertheless distinct issue: the 
relationship between competition policy and the technologies of 
information. Technological change can both facilitate and undermine the 
use of information for anticompetitive practices.20 The effects are 
                                                                                                                     
 11. 334 U.S. 131, 137 (1948). 
 12. 342 U.S. 143, 148, 155 (1951). 
 13. E.g., Mich. Citizens for an Indep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1286–87 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) (interpreting the Newspaper Preservation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1804 (2012)); see 
also 1B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 251e (4th ed. 2013) 
(discussing the Newspaper Preservation Act as an antitrust exemption). 
 14. 345 U.S. 594 (1953). 
 15. Id. at 596–97, 627. 
 16. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 17. Id. at 22–25. 
 18. See Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 1998) (granting 
Noerr-Pennington immunity to health-care provider who allegedly provided false information to 
authority to induce its refusal to permit another firm to enter the market). 
 19. See, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 
(1965); Transweb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Properties Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1306–12 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (applying Walker Process). 
 20. See, e.g., Rachel Aridor-Hershkovitz, Antitrust Law—A Stranger in the Wikinomics 
World? Regulating Anti-Competitive Use of the DRM/DMCA Regime, 27 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 2–6 (2009) (discussing technological regime changes in digital rights 
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heavily, although not exclusively, a result of digitization and the many 
products and processes that it enables.21 Further, information 
technologies account for a significant portion of the difficulties that 
antitrust law encounters when it addresses intellectual property (IP) 
rights.22 In addition, changes in the technologies of information affect the 
structures of certain products, in the process either increasing or 
decreasing the potential for competitive harm.23 Of particular importance 
here are the measurement of market power in heavily digital 
technologies; the changing role of consumer choice in digital markets, 
focusing here on the Google Search investigation; the impact of 
digitization on the opportunities for collusion, focusing on the Apple 
eBooks antitrust case; the role of the antitrust laws in facilitating net 
neutrality or other conceptions of internet competition; and the role of 
information in antitrust evaluation of patent practices, particularly those 
pertaining to FRAND licensing in markets subject to standard setting, and 
patent pools. 
I.  DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AND MARKET POWER 
The principal feature distinguishing antitrust from other legal controls 
of improper business conduct is that antitrust is concerned with practices 
that threaten the exercise of “market power,” or the power to profit by 
reducing output below the competitive level, thereby increasing the 
price.24 If a firm without power reduces its output, others will quickly 
make up the output loss, and price will be unaffected.25 So to have market 
                                                                                                                     
copyright law leading to anticompetitive practices).  
 21. See id. at 2.  
 22. Dana R. Wagner, The Keepers of the Gates: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and the 
Regulatory Implications of Systems Technology, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1073, 1073–76 (2000).  
 23. E.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1066–67 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(software), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1947 (2014); Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 956, 958 
(9th Cir. 2013) (digital music plus devices); Lavoho, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 395, 396 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (eBooks); Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (licensed television programming); Comput. Automation Sys., Inc. v. Intelutions, 998 F. 
Supp. 2d 3, 6–7 (D.P.R. 2014) (software); United States v. Apple, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 263, 266 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (eBooks), aff’d, 787 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2015); Kickflip, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 
999 F. Supp. 2d 677, 682 (D. Del. 2013) (social network); Blizzard Entm’t Inc. v. Ceiling Fan 
Software LLC, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1006, 1010 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (computer game software); Oracle 
Am., Inc. v. CedarCrestone, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 2d 895, 896–97 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (software); 
Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (digital books settlement 
litigation); TradeComet.com LLC v. Google Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(search engine advertising), aff’d in part, 647 F.3d 472 (2d Cir. 2011), and aff’d in part, 435 Fed. 
Appx. 31 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 24. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶ 501, at 109 (4th ed. 2014). 
 25. Id. 
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power, a firm (or group of firms acting in concert) must generally be large 
enough to remove a sizeable share of output from the market.26 In 
addition, something must restrain rivals or potential rivals from either 
entering the market or increasing their own output.27 Fraud, consumer 
deception, hard bargaining, and some business torts involving destruction 
or disparagement of rivals’ assets can all affect the price of a product. 
They are not antitrust violations, however, unless they threaten to 
increase or prolong market power. This market power requirement is 
essential to most antitrust analysis because so many practices, such as 
technology sharing, tying arrangements, agreements to deal exclusively 
with a single firm, refusals to deal, and mergers, are socially benign or 
beneficial in competitive markets. For these practices, market power is a 
necessary, although usually not sufficient, condition for competitive 
harm. 
Digital technology affects the way firms exercise market power and 
also imposes serious measurement difficulties. The digital revolution in 
product development and distribution has occurred in stages. The most 
extreme is “complete” digital distribution where all of the content shipped 
to the consumer is digital.28 Prior to that and continuing to this day, music, 
some books, and other media are distributed in formats such as digital 
compact disc (CD) or digital video disc (DVD).29 Although most of the 
direct user content in such formats is digital, it is still downloaded onto a 
physical object, which is then packaged and distributed to consumers 
through traditional channels, including brick-and-mortar retailers and the 
mail.30 By contrast, complete digital distribution refers to markets such 
as those for downloaded songs and downloaded or streamed video 
content, including movies, games, and software, as well as electronic 
books.31 The entire consumer “package” is distributed purely 
electronically. Of course, taking advantage of digital content requires a 
device capable of reading and processing it, and a fair amount of litigation 
involves these devices or restraints that tie the digital content to these 
devices.32 
One important consequence of complete product digitization is the 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. at 109–10. 
 27. Id. ¶ 420, at 73 (describing barriers to entry or competitor mobility). 
 28. Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 890 
(2011). 
 29. See id. at 890–91, 890 n.1. 
 30. See id.  
 31. See id. at 890–91.  
 32. See, e.g., Tucker v. Apple Comput., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2006) 
(rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge to technological tie between Apple music playing devices and 
iTunes music database).  
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effect on the opportunities firms have to exercise market power.33 
Another is the change in the size or shape of the markets in which firms 
compete.34 The production and distribution of digital books or other 
media is so different from traditional production and distribution in these 
markets that most historical analogies fail us. For instance, eBooks 
compete everywhere that electronic transmission is available. Further, 
they can be transmitted anywhere at nearly no cost, and costs typically do 
not vary with transmission distance. This means that the “relevant 
antitrust market”35 in which competition occurs is at least nationwide and 
perhaps worldwide.36 As a result, local retailers such as bookstores, who 
might have a certain amount of power in smaller communities, face 
increased competition even though no additional local retailers have 
entered the market. 
These facts do not necessarily mean that traditional booksellers and 
eBook sellers operate in the same antitrust market, however. An antitrust 
market, or “relevant market,” is one in which goods are not only 
substitutes for one another, and the competition of other sellers is 
sufficient to prevent any single firm from increasing its price significantly 
by reducing output.37 Each firm’s prices will then remain close to its 
costs.38 Determining this is particularly difficult when the two sellers 
have very different technologies of distribution, as is the case with 
traditional products and completely digital alternatives, even for the same 
title. For example, a traditional CD store may be able to compete 
effectively with downloaded music only when the latter is priced at a 
large markup above its costs.39 If that is the case, then the completely 
digital music seller may have significant market power even when 
competing traditional sellers are present.  
The same thing is true of movies, which can be distributed through 
brick-and-mortar theaters, DVDs (either purchased in a store or rented 
through the mail), cable television, or internet streaming.40 A casual 
observer might see the very same consumers obtaining movies by all of 
these means, switching back and forth among them. But it would be 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the 
iPod Fairplay DRM Controversy, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332, 332–33, 348–49 (2007). 
 34. See id. at 332–33.  
 35. 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 539, at 317.  
 36. See, e.g., Lavoho, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 3d 395, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(involving small domestic sellers of ebooks—with foreign purchasers—that claimed injury 
resulting from an Apple-orchestrated price-fixing agreement and most-favored-nation clause).  
 37. See 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 539, at 317. 
 38. See id.  
 39. E.g., In re Dig. Music Antitrust Litig., 812 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
 40. Howard Marvel & Kivanc Kirgiz, Recent Antitrust Issues in Distribution of DVDs, 15 
ABA SEC. ANTITRUST 9, 9 (2011).  
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premature to conclude that they are meaningful antitrust competitors 
unless the presence of one of them is sufficient to hold the prices of 
another reasonably close to cost. A few decisions have made this error.41 
Competition generally drives prices toward short-run marginal cost, 
which is the incremental cost of producing one additional unit.42 A 
pervasive problem in analyzing power in digital markets is that sellers 
typically have a very high ratio of fixed to variable costs.43 This entails 
that prices must be considerably above short-run marginal cost to be 
profitable,44 lest the firm be unable to recover its fixed costs. For 
example, it might cost $10 million to develop the code for Microsoft 
Office but only $5 per disc to manufacture and distribute physical copies 
on a DVD. If Microsoft competed head-to-head with several makers of 
indistinguishable copies, the price would be driven toward $5, and the 
firms would be unable to recover their large investment. If Microsoft 
streamed the program to users over broadband, distribution costs would 
fall to nearly zero. 
As a result of these facts, many traditional measures of market power 
produce unacceptable false positives.45 These measures include the 
Lerner Index and other tools derived from it. Beginning with the 
observation that competition drives prices toward marginal cost, the 
Lerner Index assesses power by the ratio (P–MC)/P, where P is the 
observed price, and MC is the firm’s short-run marginal cost at that 
price.46 At a competitive price, which equals marginal cost, the index 
reads zero.47 As the degree of market power increases, the index value 
approaches one.48 Significantly, however, the Lerner Index is completely 
indifferent to fixed costs.49 As a result, an all-digital firm could be 
                                                                                                                     
 41. See, e.g., Cable Holdings of Ga., Inc., v. Home Video, Inc., 825 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (grouping into a single relevant market all movies: theatrical first- or subsequent-run, 
video rentals, and cable television); United States v. Syufy Enters., 712 F. Supp. 1386, 1389 (N.D. 
Cal. 1989) (finding the contemporary product market to be first- and sub-run motion picture 
exhibits, home video, and cable and pay-per-view television), aff’d, 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990).  
 42. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700 (1975). 
 43. E.g., 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 520, at 216. 
 44. Id. at 216–17.  
 45. Daniel A. Crane, Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
31, 59–60 (2014).  
 46. See generally A. P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of 
Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934) (explaining what would come to be known as 
the Lerner Index); Herbert Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 
2133, 2140–41 (2012).   
 47. Id. 
 48. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE §§ 3.1–3.2 (5th ed. 2015). 
 49. Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 2140.  
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charging a price much higher than its marginal cost, thus showing 
significant power, but still be going bankrupt because it cannot recover 
its fixed costs. 
The short-run marginal cost of digital delivery is typically very low, 
including any required payment of per use royalties, as well as the trivial 
marginal cost of electronic transmission. For example, once the eBook or 
digital music file is in place, the cost of selling or streaming an additional 
copy is only a little above zero. So in complete digital distribution, where 
only the digital content passes from the seller to the buyer, the Lerner 
Index reading can create a false impression of substantial market power. 
That naturally invites a question: If digital media are sold in 
competition with one another, then why is the price not zero or something 
very close to zero? That answer lies in the twin effects of IP protection—
namely, per use royalties and product differentiation. A per use royalty is 
a variable cost that the seller incurs each time it sells a unit.50 Therefore, 
it is part of marginal cost. For example, if the author of an eBook is 
entitled to one dollar on each copy sold, then the cost of distribution must 
be at least one dollar per copy. By contrast, lump sum royalties, which 
are a single royalty on a product over its entire commercial life,51 do not 
show up in marginal costs. For example, if a person sells a story to a 
digital magazine for $2,000 and that is the only revenue expectation from 
this story, then that $2,000 is a fixed cost to the magazine and does not 
affect marginal costs. It pays no more in royalties when it sells an 
additional copy. That is also the case for many academic authors who 
may not receive any royalty for their scientific or technical articles. Once 
again, the marginal cost of electronic distribution is practically zero. 
Nonetheless, articles in digitized academic journals for which the 
authors receive no royalties are hardly priced at zero. In fact, they can be 
very expensive.52 This is true because IP rights also create product 
differentiation, which blunts the impact of competition quite 
considerably, even when there are no royalties. For example, Amazon at 
this writing (April 2016) lists more than 281 Kindle electronic Italian 
cookbooks, ranging in price from zero to twenty-five dollars.53 Books that 
                                                                                                                     
 50. See Christopher B. Seaman, Ongoing Royalties in Patent Cases After eBay: An 
Empirical Assessment and Proposed Framework, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 203, 225 (2015).  
 51. Id. at 223–24.  
 52. See, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? The 
“Big Deal” Bundling of Academic Journals, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 154–55 (2004); see also 
DANIELLE JURSKI & BRIDGET LAMB, STUDY OF SUBSCRIPTION PRICES FOR SCHOLARLY SOCIETY 
JOURNALS: SOCIETY JOURNAL PRICING TRENDS AND INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 2–4 (Allen Press, 2015), 
http://allenpress.com/system/files/pdfs/library/2015_Allen_Press_Study_of_Subscription_Prices
.pdf (showing that many publishers have increased prices at a steady rate since 2011). 
 53. AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com (select “Kindle Store” in search options; then 
search “Italian cookbook”) (displaying a list of Italian cookbooks available for under twenty-five 
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are still under copyright cannot be precise copies of one another. Unless 
licensed, the second of two identical books would infringe the copyright 
on the first. To the extent that they differ, however, customers have 
preferences for one over another, and this permits prices at above cost 
even though the market has multiple competitors.54 
The market for digital distribution of books for which the copyright 
has expired demonstrates the impact of legally enforceable copyright 
protection. Typically, these are books that were originally copyrighted in 
the United States before 1923. Entry into the public domain not only 
makes royalties unnecessary, but it also permits head-to-head 
competition between undifferentiated versions of a product. For example, 
the above-referenced Italian cookbook on Amazon with a price of zero 
was published in 1919, so it is in the public domain.55 The price of a fully 
digital edition of Moby Dick (originally published in 1851)—a public 
domain famous book—is also zero on several websites, including 
Amazon,56 Gutenberg,57 Google Books (several editions),58 and 
Hathitrust (also several editions).59 In this case, sellers do not need to pay 
a license fee, and different sellers can offer identical text without fear of 
copyright infringement. Stores such as Barnes & Noble also sell Moby 
Dick in unlicensed, public domain hard-copy editions. There the price is 
positive,60 however, reflecting the positive costs of individual book 
production and distribution. Finally, one element of product 
differentiation that can produce positive prices even on public domain 
digital content is format specificity. If an electronic file format is specific 
to a device, then a firm may be able to charge a positive price to owners 
of that device.61 
When traditional antitrust tools measure market power, firms with 
high fixed costs appear to have significant amounts of it.62 This problem 
is not limited to the Lerner Index. None of the antitrust tools for assessing 
                                                                                                                     
dollars).  
 54. EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 56 (1933); Drew 
Fudenberg & J. Miguel Villas-Boas, Price Discrimination in the Digital Economy, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 254 (Martin Peitz & Joel Waldfogel eds., 2012). 
 55. See AMAZON, http://amazon.com (select “Kindle Store” in search options; then search 
Maria Gentile, “The Italian Cook Book The Art of Eating Well”) (displaying a price of zero). 
 56. See AMAZON, http://amazon.com (select “Kindle Store” in search options; then search 
“Moby Dick”) (displaying a price of zero). 
 57. GUTENBERG, https://www.gutenberg.org (search book catalog field for “Moby Dick”). 
 58. GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com (search in search bar for “Moby Dick”).  
 59. HATHITRUST, https://www.hathitrust.org (search in search bar for “Moby Dick”).  
 60. BARNES & NOBLE, http://barnesandnoble.com (search in search bar for “Moby Dick”) 
(listing multiple editions for a range of positive prices, including $8.60 for a paperback edition).  
 61. For a discussion of standard setting, see infra Section V.A.  
 62. Hovenkamp, supra note 46, at 2140–41. 
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power is particularly sensitive to the presence of fixed costs.63 Even 
traditional product and geographic market definitions consider how firms 
respond to greater or lesser competition within a certain product or 
geographic range and over a relatively short period of time.64 For 
example, a court might assess an antitrust market by considering the price 
responses that occur when a new pizza restaurant comes into a 
community that previously had only one or the amount by which one firm 
lowers its price in response to a perceived competitor’s price cut. But 
these short-run responses generally assume fixed-cost assets that are 
already in place, so most of the responses, such as lowering one’s price 
when new entry occurs, consider mainly variable costs. Courts generally 
do not consider previous investment in such things as research and 
development.65 
Antitrust should not draw an inference of substantial market power 
unless returns over a fairly long run are excessive. Often purely digital 
products are sold in competitive, product-differentiated markets. For 
example, the market for “apps” for electronic calculators or notepads that 
can run on a device such as an iPad often shows competition among 
numerous suppliers.66 These markets are simultaneously competitive but 
may also exhibit high price–cost margins if courts only consider the short 
run.67 Product differentiation largely explains prices above marginal cost 
as well as differences in pricing. 
A single firm’s inability to earn high returns over the long run does 
not preclude the exercise of market power. It does mean, however, that 
participating firms must exercise market power collaboratively rather 
than unilaterally.68 For example, a combination of high fixed costs plus 
low variable costs, as in the “app” example,69 creates inducements for 
price fixing or in some cases for market division, which occurs when two 
or more sellers can slice the market into pieces, giving each seller an 
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exclusive right in each piece.70 Both price fixing and market division can 
reduce market-wide output and increase the prices of the product in 
question, but only if the participating firms collectively hold market 
power.71 If a cartel of firms lacking any power (such as a group of ten 
tomato growers in a market of 10,000) attempted to raise prices, they 
would simply lose all their sales. 
While high fixed costs might explain why a cartel occurs, they 
certainly do not justify it. One reason is that product differentiation is 
typically sufficient to produce above-cost returns even when fixed costs 
are high.72 The real concern is markets with high fixed costs whose output 
cannot be differentiated. 
Another reason for not tolerating price fixing in markets with high 
fixed costs is that colluding firms will charge the monopoly (or cartel) 
price, not the minimum profitable price.73 The full monopoly price in a 
market could be much higher than the minimum price necessary to 
sustain production and thus represents a significant wealth transfer away 
from consumers74 as well as inefficiency losses from lower output.75 
Courts can assess naked price fixing and market division under 
antitrust’s per se rule without an inquiry into market power.76 That still 
leaves the problem of unilateral conduct or collaborative activities that 
have efficiency-creating potential, which courts traditionally assess under 
the rule of reason. This requires an assessment of market power, 
regardless of whether it is difficult to accomplish. 
In its recent Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc.77 decision, 
which involved competition between name-brand and bioequivalent 
generic pharmaceutical drugs,78 the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
courts could infer market power from a large “pay-for-delay” 
settlement from a branded drug maker to a generic.79 Under that 
agreement, the generic firm would stay out of the market for a 
                                                                                                                     
 70. 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 2000, at 6.  
 71. See id.¶ 2000, at 7. 
 72. 2B AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & SOLOW, supra note 24, ¶ 520, at 219. 
 73. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 2001a, at 8–9.  
 74. See William H. Page, A Neo-Chicago Approach to Concerted Action, 78 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 173, 175–76 (2012). 
 75. See Jonathan B. Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the 
Non-interventionist Challenge to Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 605 
(2010). 
 76. See 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, ¶ 2004, at 68.  
 77. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 78. Id. at 2224–25.  
 79. Id. at 2236–37 (referring to the settlement as a “reverse payment”); Aaron Edlin, Scott 
Hemphill, Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, The Actavis Inference: Theory and Practice, 67 
RUTGERS L. REV. 585, 586 (2015).  
 
430 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
specified term in exchange for the pioneer’s payment, often in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars.80 The high pay-for-delay settlement 
indicates power because it shows that the payer has volume and 
margins worth protecting.81 To be sure, the payer’s output may reflect 
the power of a valid patent, but the patent validity question should not 
be confused with the power question. Further, even if a patent is 
perfectly valid, a horizontal price-fixing or market-division agreement 
is not justified for the same reason noted above—it tends to equate the 
value of the patent with the full monopoly or cartel value of the 
market.82 
As Actavis suggests, in some cases one can estimate market power 
from behavior, and these estimates can be more reliable than estimates 
taken from information about price–cost relationships.83 Just like digital 
technology, pharmaceuticals are a market where high price–cost margins 
are poor indicators of power because they do not pick up development 
costs, which are significant but incurred up front, mainly prior to 
production.84 Production costs are low, and margins are consequently 
very high. As a result, prices often drop dramatically when a chemically 
identical generic competitor enters the market. This is most dramatic 
when two or more generic equivalents enter a market previously occupied 
by only a single pioneer drug manufacturer.85 These differences between 
price and short-run cost are not as extreme as for purely digital 
technologies, but they are substantial nonetheless. 
An important message of Actavis is that courts can infer market power 
from other criteria than market definition or price–cost relationships in 
circumstances where this more traditional evidence is not very helpful. 
Behaviors such as making large payments to keep someone out of one’s 
market are rational acts only on the premise that a firm has significant 
power.86 Courts should look more closely at these nontraditional 
mechanisms for evaluating power, including the ability to impose 
onerous terms on others. 
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Another common feature of digital markets is networks, which also 
create complexities for assessing market power. Networked markets are 
frequently “two-sided” or multi-sided. This means that transactions move 
along more than a single avenue between buyers and the seller.87 The 
seller in a two-sided market faces two or more groups of buyers that can 
either compete with or complement one another.88 
For example, credit card companies must compete for both merchant 
acceptance and card users, and a practice that enlarges one side might 
either enlarge or diminish the other side. Too high a price to merchants 
will reduce their number, and this in turn will make the card less valuable 
to users. Therefore, to determine the optimal price to merchants, the card 
issuer must consider the impact on card users as well. Subscription 
magazines also earn revenue from both subscribers and advertisers. The 
advertisers are willing to pay more as the subscription audience grows, 
and these higher payments reduce the magazine’s revenue needs from 
consumers. For their part, consumers might welcome lower magazine 
prices but also might resist excessive advertising. To earn a profit, the 
magazine must optimize across these two groups together.89 In some 
cases, the optimal price to one group is zero.90 In traditional television 
antenna markets as well as non-satellite AM and FM radio, for example, 
consumers watch or listen for free, and the stations earn their revenue 
completely from advertisers. A bigger audience increases advertising 
revenue, but at least some members of the audience may switch channels 
if they hear more advertising than they want. A similar situation occurs 
in large internet search engines, such as Google Search, which is largely 
free to users but financed by advertising.91 
Multi-sided markets are a common feature of digital networks. A 
variety of digital websites such as news magazines, music servers, and 
some games are free to users and supported by advertising.92 Other digital 
websites, including Spotify or Pandora, come in both a free version that 
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advertising largely supports and also a premium version for which the 
users pay and the provider removes or severely limits advertising.93 
Looking only at the listener market, one might see a form of price 
discrimination intended to capture both high-demand premium and low-
demand free customers. But price discrimination involves selling at 
different ratios of price to cost. Before measuring these ratios, one must 
know the revenue from both customer use and advertising. Conceivably, 
the platform operator earns more from its “free” advertising-supported 
customers than from its paid customers. 
Measuring market power in multi-sided markets poses special 
difficulties because of “feedback” effects that occur when a price change 
in one side affects size and revenue on a different side. Looking at one 
side alone, there is no necessary relationship between price and marginal 
cost, and even a consumer price of zero may be a component in a perfectly 
rational and competitive business strategy.94 Assessing market power 
often requires looking at all sides of the market together. For example, it 
would be incorrect to conclude that an advertising-sponsored internet 
music site lacked power because its price to subscribers is zero. It would 
also be incorrect to conclude that a magazine has substantial market 
power because a significant change in the subscription price would not 
lead to a profit-defeating reduction in subscribers. The loss of revenue 
from subscribers would have to be added to any loss of advertising 
revenue that results from a lower subscription base.95 
Market multi-sidedness can make traditional market share measures 
much less valuable as well. By charging a price of zero, for example, a 
seller might acquire an enormous share of the audience market for its 
particular product. However, its share of the advertising market in which 
it actually earns its revenue might be very small. Further, the advertising 
market and the audience market might have very different boundaries. 
For example, a magazine about sports fishing might appeal mainly to 
people whose hobby is fishing, but it might attract advertisers from a 
number of different markets that do not compete with one another, 
including fishing equipment, travel agencies, airlines, resort rentals, 
boats, outdoor clothing, and the like. These advertisers might advertise in 
a wide variety of markets related to sports and leisure but hardly limited 
to fishing. 
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These problems are further exacerbated by the fact that in most multi-
sided platform markets, fixed costs are high, which limits the use of 
price–cost margins to assess power.96 These complexities have led to the 
criticism that antitrust agencies often ignore multi-sidedness and consider 
power by focusing their attention excessively or exclusively on one side 
of the market alone.97 Countering this is the fact that whether a practice 
is unreasonably exclusionary is often a consequence of market share or 
dominance. Moreover, a firm that is dominant in one side of a multi-sided 
market can often exclude rivals anticompetitively. 
All of these factors serve as a warning that assessment of market 
power is extremely difficult in markets characterized by very low variable 
costs, IP rights, networking, multi-sidedness, or some combination of 
these things. Not uncommonly, networked digital markets exhibit all of 
them.98 Power evaluations in these situations are at significant risk of 
false positives or false negatives if the market is not fully understood. 
Further, answers may differ depending on the question. Suppose that 
there are twenty note-taking “apps” available for the iPad or other Apple 
devices. Each one of these, assuming it is not free, sells at a price 
considerably above short-run marginal cost. This latter fact, standing 
alone, should not establish a monopoly power requirement for an 
exclusionary practice. It is also necessary to determine just how the 
defendant app manufacturer’s practice will result in market-wide (as 
opposed to individual) exclusion as well as the likelihood that such 
exclusion will occur. At the same time, however, there is no need to 
hesitate to condemn price fixing or naked market division among these 
same manufacturers. 
Finally, as noted previously, in purely digital markets, IP rights are 
almost always crucial to the exercise of significant market power.99 The 
principal IP right relevant here is copyright, although trademark rights 
and occasionally patents may have importance as well. Once a book such 
as Moby Dick enters the public domain, it can be very cheaply copied, 
and digitization reduces inventory and distribution costs to practically 
nothing.100 Therefore, even explicit price fixing is not likely to maintain 
prices above cost for extended periods of time. If an anticompetitive 
restraint should occur, it would not be in the public domain product itself, 
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although it could be in the hardware or infrastructure necessary for 
distributing such content. What makes collusion in digital media 
profitable is copyright protection, which permits cartel members to 
charge a higher price without losing excessive sales to outsiders.101 
These observations should highlight one feature of digital markets that 
has been the focus of substantial antitrust litigation—namely, the 
“product” that consumers want is frequently only the tail, while the 
delivery device is the dog. For example, the major bottlenecks in the 
eBook and eMusic industries have not been the books or songs 
themselves, which are rarely capable of being monopolized, but rather 
technological constraints on reading or listening devices and the file 
formats that they run. In the ongoing Apple iPod iTunes Antitrust 
Litigation,102 the plaintiffs claim that Apple strategically manipulated 
hardware configurations and file formats to maintain incompatibility with 
non-Apple systems, thus locking customers into a single technology and 
set of Apple devices.103 In these situations, the enemy of competition is 
incompatibility, or lack of portability, across platforms. The discussion 
below of antitrust policy and Google Search illustrates the sometimes 
unappreciated importance of portability. 
II.  DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES AND CONSUMER CHOICE: GOOGLE SEARCH 
The other side of the market power coin is consumer choice. One 
consequence of the simultaneous revolutions in telecommunications and 
digital technology is that consumers have never faced a wider array of 
choices, and the cost of switching among alternative products has never 
been lower.104 
Here, an important factor is the degree of dependence between 
dedicated hardware and compatible digital choices.105 While purely 
digital systems are or can be highly portable across different platforms, 
hardware is often much less so.106 Consider the differences between the 
Microsoft/Windows cases from more than a decade ago and the Google 
Search cases, now likely concluded in the United States but ongoing in 
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Europe.107 Microsoft was able to exploit a high degree of dedication 
between computer hardware—so called “IBM-compatible” or Intel-
based computer stations—and the Windows operating systems.108 A 
business that operated 300 Windows computers could switch to the Apple 
operating system only by switching out its computers. This would be 
extraordinarily costly, not only because of the computers themselves but 
also because of the training of employees, the replacement of a great deal 
of application software, and so on.109 
The Google Search cases present a sharp contrast. The U.S. and EU 
investigations into Google Search should be regarded skeptically, 
notwithstanding Google’s high search market share in Europe.110 Most 
search engines are multi-platform products that run equally well on all of 
the most popular platforms, which include Windows, Apple, and Android 
devices. To be sure, Google may be the default or preinstalled search 
engine on Android mobile phones and some others, but consumers can 
generally install alternative search engines. Microsoft makes its own 
search engine, Bing, which is generally the default search engine 
accompanying Microsoft operating systems.111 The story for desktop and 
laptop computers is even simpler from the consumers’ perspective. 
Consumers can install any of the more popular search engines, of which 
there are many, almost instantaneously and at no charge. Not 
uncommonly, computer users have several search engines available. Any 
time they are unhappy with the results of one engine’s search, they can 
turn to another one. 
Here, high market share should not be confused with monopoly. The 
latter requires the ability to hold prices above the competitive level or 
provide an inferior service even while retaining one’s own dominant 
market share.112 As a result, competition policy makers should be wary 
of technological locks that make it difficult for consumers to switch to a 
different search engine. Having done that, the concern about the content 
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of a particular search becomes far less important. 
To be sure, deception is a problem. Most deception has nothing to do 
with monopoly, however, and consumer protection or tort law best 
addresses the problem. For a durable monopoly to exist, consumers must 
pay too much (or obtain too little) and be helpless to do anything about 
it. By contrast, the best cure for deception is to enjoin or penalize it. For 
example, there is far less reason for concern about a Google search result 
that favors its own asset, such as YouTube, a Google subsidiary, if 
searchers (1) know about the ownership interest and (2) have easy access 
to alternative search engines. If Google persistently favors its own assets 
in a way that harmed consumers, then consumers can readily and without 
cost switch to a different search engine. The best way to address this 
problem is informational: requiring Google to inform consumers when 
favored sites are located more prominently in search results. “Favored” 
in this context means either assets that Google owns or where Google has 
accepted compensation for high placement. Beyond that, management of 
search algorithms is best left to the market. 
This suggests that the competition law authorities should focus on 
ensuring that every platform from which search engines are launched, 
including mobile platforms, have adequate alternatives available to which 
reasonably well-informed customers can easily switch. If a more forceful 
behavioral approach is necessary, managing the default search engine is 
a much simpler solution than managing the search algorithm. Further, as 
one episode suggests, it is likely to be effective. Early in 2015, Firefox, 
the third-most popular web browser worldwide and in the United 
States,113 shifted its default search engine from Google to Yahoo.114 Soon 
after, Google’s share of all U.S. search dropped from 77.3% to 75.2%, 
while Yahoo’s increased from 8.6% to 10.6%.115 Interestingly, Microsoft 
Bing, which was not involved in the change of the default search engine, 
was unaffected.116 Looking only at Firefox users, Google’s share of 
search fell from 86.1% to 60.8%, while Yahoo’s increased from 7.5% to 
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32.2%.117 This data suggests that the choice of a default search engine 
can have an impact on market share, although at this writing it is too early 
to say how significant or durable these changes will be. Managing search 
engine defaults would be a far more tractable approach to this 
competition problem than any attempt to micromanage the Google search 
algorithm, which will almost certainly require ongoing supervision, 
effectively turning Google Search into a public utility. A simple order 
could prevent the sale of devices with a default search engine and instead 
require users to select a default. 
Of course, as one journalist pointed out, customers who use the 
Firefox browser with Yahoo as the default search engine can always 
switch back, and some of them have.118 Nevertheless, the market share 
response to a switch in the default search engine means a great deal for 
competition policy analysis. If Google is in fact a monopolist, why would 
someone switch back to it? Assuming that they are not constrained to do 
so, the explanation is that they prefer Google Search for some reason. In 
that case, antitrust has no business interfering. 
III.  DIGITIZATION, COST STRUCTURE, AND COLLUSION: THE EBOOKS 
ANTITRUST CASE 
In re Electronic Books Antitrust Litigation119 is a challenge to 
collusive behavior born in the United States but later expanded to Europe 
and elsewhere. Apple facilitated the creation of a cartel of book 
publishers that not only increased the price of electronic books but also 
imposed pricing rules in the form of most-favored-nation clauses on 
Apple’s competitor, Amazon.120 Here, the most-favored-nation clause 
was a contractual provision that required the publishers to charge a price 
for electronic books sold through Apple’s rivals, principally Amazon, to 
be at least as high as the prices charged through Apple’s own electronic 
book store.121 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit later 
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affirmed this judgment.122 
The technology of eBooks is currently transforming the book market, 
with implications that go far beyond this particular price-fixing 
agreement. Most significantly, eBooks are rapidly changing the cost 
structure of the industry from one that had a nontrivial fixed-cost 
component and relatively high variable costs to one in which nearly all 
the costs other than royalties and very small distribution costs are fixed.123 
For traditional publishing, fixed costs generally refer to the costs of 
manuscript acquisitions, editorial staff, typesetting, and at least some 
marketing.124 Variable costs include paper and other stock, printing, 
cutting, binding, inventory, shipping, and retailer carrying costs.125 The 
publishing market has never been particularly problematic for antitrust 
enforcers. The market contained numerous small publishers and only 
rarely had a dominant firm.126 The total number of sellers and a 
substantial amount of product differentiation limited the chances for 
collusion. The one exception was local readership newspapers, which 
could acquire a dominant position in their geographic markets.127 
The book industry does have a long history of resale price 
maintenance, which is publisher setting of retail prices. In the United 
States, it actually dates back to 1908, before courts even applied the 
antitrust laws to the practice. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,128 the 
Supreme Court refused to enforce a price maintenance clause in a 
copyright license agreement.129 However, the vehicle was not 
competition policy but rather copyright law’s “first-sale” doctrine.130 The 
British “Net Book Agreement,” which largely prevented discounting of 
books below the publisher’s announced price, was another example.131 
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Today, most resale price maintenance is once again legal in the United 
States,132 although the European Union and Canada deal with it more 
harshly.133 
The eBook has drastically changed the cost structure of the book 
publishing market. Acquisition, editing costs, and royalties are still 
variable, but editing has become less expensive in the age of 
computerized text management.134 Once a book has been typeset into an 
electronic file, the publisher has spent most fixed costs except for 
advertising and promotion.135 Further, while advertising might be 
considered a variable cost for some purposes, it is not a cost attached to 
each unit sold. In fact, the advertising accompanying an eBook is itself 
digitized. No one needs to maintain an inventory of copies other than a 
master copy of the digital file. Publishers can make a virtually infinite 
number of copies, all at the trivial cost of electronic transmission. 
This change in cost structure is having remarkable effects on the book 
market, many of which are not yet realized. First, as the Electronic Books 
litigation illustrates, it increases the incentive to collude.136 This is true of 
many industries with high fixed costs. Competition tends to drive prices 
to variable, or marginal, cost without enough remaining to cover fixed 
costs. Offsetting this in the book industry is product differentiation: each 
title is unique, very likely giving publishers at least some pricing 
discretion. 
The dramatic rise of the eBook has cut enormously into the sales of 
traditional brick-and-mortar bookstores and the national distribution of 
physical hard- and soft-copy books.137 Eventually, it may even threaten 
the existence of any book retailer who is independent of the publisher, 
including giants such as Apple and Amazon. While Apple’s thirty percent 
markup has been widely noted, actual markups vary from something less 
than that amount to more than 100% for independently published 
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books.138 These markups seem very high in relation to the services 
rendered. Publishers need not inventory eBooks, and there is little 
concern about returns or losses. As a result, risk is minimal. Most of the 
relevant publication and promotional information is in electronic form, 
and the publisher supplies this information. To be sure, major retailers 
such as Amazon and Apple offer a format for reading the book file, but 
the format market is competitive and new ones are being introduced all 
the time.139 Many of the larger commercial publishers, such as Penguin 
Random House, Hachette, Harper Collins, Simon & Schuster, 
Macmillan, Harlequin, as well as the quasi-commercial university 
presses, such as Oxford, Harvard, and Cambridge, produce eBooks in a 
variety of formats.140 Others, such as Penn Press, tend to favor direct 
distribution intended for more generic formats, such as Adobe Digital 
Editions or Bluefire Reader.141 Public domain eBooks such as those 
published before 1923 in the United States are available in an even wider 
variety of file formats.142 
The day may come when the dealer intermediary in the book market 
becomes superfluous. To survive, intermediaries such as Amazon and 
Apple will have to provide sufficient value to publishers to make them 
the best choice. Alternatively, they may try to take advantage of market 
restraints such as technological incompatibilities or technology ties with 
their devices. These restraints might delay migration to more efficient 
distribution methods but probably not indefinitely. 
There is no good technological or business reason for why publishers, 
or perhaps a consortia of publishers, cannot directly distribute eBooks to 
an internet site. A system may emerge that is roughly equivalent to the 
“blanket license” that governs the distribution of recorded music over 
radio stations or other media.143 That is, authors’ books would be 
digitized and then placed by nonexclusive license into a massive database 
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accessible by a website. Readers could then pay for and download 
individual titles, which they could then preserve themselves or else have 
maintained on a cloud service operated by the website. The website could 
offer any number of file formats. The transaction costs associated with 
this type of system would be very low. If run by the publishers 
themselves, it would eliminate an intermediary’s markup. 
While some observers of the book business see a monopoly 
equilibrium favoring giant intermediaries such as Amazon,144 the history 
of industrial organization and antitrust strongly suggests the contrary. 
Two powerful evolutionary, output-increasing phenomena are relevant 
here: vertical integration and coalescence around a standard. 
Firms integrate vertically when it is profitable, and the main sources 
of profit are elimination of costly market transactions, production cost 
savings that accrue when a firm performs successive steps internally, and 
elimination of double marginalization, or monopoly or cartel pricing in 
either an upstream or a downstream market.145 For example, oil refiners 
fearful of collusion among gasoline stations may respond by distributing 
gasoline directly through wholly owned stations.  
A publisher-owned consortium could reduce double-marginalization 
problems that arise under third-party distribution, particularly if the 
reading device market is competitive. Double marginalization occurs 
when firms are in a seller–reseller relationship or provide complementary 
products, each firm has a certain amount of market power, and the two 
are unable to coordinate their output.146 In that case, each firm maximizes 
individually. Final price will be higher and output lower than 
otherwise.147 But if the publisher sells its own books directly to 
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consumers, double marginalization is not an issue as to the books, and the 
only worry is market power in the device market. As to devices, however, 
as long as the hardware device market is competitive or reading apps for 
covered file formats are available for zero or little cost, double 
marginalization should not be a problem. Today, a variety of readers for 
various file formats are available as free downloads.148 
In the eBook industry, Amazon’s markups, assuming they are in 
excess of distribution costs, provide a classic opportunity for vertical 
integration. One attribute of digital distribution is that the costs of vertical 
integration are very low, certainly much lower than the cost of building a 
nationwide network of gasoline stations or retail stores. To the extent 
intermediaries such as Amazon and Apple are charging too high a price 
for distribution services, one would expect publishers to integrate 
vertically into distribution. Authors and artists as well as consumers 
would benefit. 
To be sure, traditional booksellers often supply important point-of-
sale information in addition to the books themselves. For example, a well-
informed employee in a high-quality bookshop can be a treasure trove of 
information. But a proliferation of online sources, including both 
professional and readers’ book reviews, has greatly eclipsed that 
particular informational service. 
As to coalescence around a single standard, one can assume that most 
readers want their books conveniently accessible, which means that 
readers can access and store them on a single device. Incompatible 
devices or file formats can frustrate this, and part of Amazon’s success is 
that it has been able to provide a one-stop shop for people’s reading as 
well as the largest bookstore, at least for books that are still under 
copyright. Even here, however, it has had to make some concessions. For 
example, Amazon never been able to attain a significant position in the 
device market,149 and just as people want their reading in one place, they 
also want other types of computer activities in one place. So Amazon 
offers free Kindle reader apps for iPhones and iPads as well as Microsoft-
based and Android devices other than Kindle.150 Amazon’s real claim to 
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control is its proprietary software and eBook format. A reader’s books 
are freely transportable to Kindle apps on other devices, but they are not 
so easily transportable to non-Kindle software formats.151 
One bottleneck to efficient eBook distribution is proprietary 
standards. While copyright and perhaps some patents protect file formats, 
a wide variety of them are available. The history of most technologies is 
that for an initial period, a great deal of incompatibility exists as each 
seller attempts to market its own preferred format or distribution system. 
In the early days of the automobile, cars burned many types of fuels, and 
the early days of videotapes saw a standards war between Sony Betamax 
and VHS. Later came high-density digital video, with a competitive fight 
between Blu-Ray and HD DVD. Because these various standards are 
inefficient, unification tends to occur as the industry matures.152 Today, 
a large number of publishers and manufacturers of electronic readers have 
coalesced around the EPUB file format.153 While Amazon’s Kindle files 
and devices are largely incompatible with EPUB,154 workarounds are 
available.155 
Movement toward a single standard is likely to happen in the eBook 
market as well. The Internet and device market will develop readers that 
will cover the new standard and enable consumers to maintain a single 
electronic library for books procured from different sources. 
Alternatively, conversion will be so easy and foolproof that the market 
will be able to accommodate multiple file formats. Whether firms such 
as Amazon and Apple will be able to hold out by offering unique features 
is difficult to say, but this Article ventures a prediction that in the long 
run, theirs will be a losing battle. In particular, why should a large 
publishing house continue to pay Amazon a significant commission when 
it can self-distribute for much less? 
 
                                                                                                                     
display.html?nodeId=200783640 (last visited Apr. 4, 2016).  
 151. However, conversion programs for Kindle’s AZW file format are generally available 
online at no cost. See, e.g., Kevin Pan, How to Convert Kindle AZW to EPUB/PDF/RTF/TXT 
Format?, EBOOK-CONVERTER, http://www.ebook-converter.com/69-how-to-convert-kindle-azw-
other-format.htm (last updated Nov. 30, 2015) (Kindle AZW to epub). 
 152. See BOHANNAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 129, at 357–63 (recounting the development 
of unified standards). 
 153. See EPUB, INT’L DIG. PUBL’G F., http://idpf.org/epub (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
 154. See Nelson Aguilar, How to Add Any eBook Format to Your Kindle Fire HDX, 
WONDERHOWTO, http://fire.wonderhowto.com/how-to/add-any-ebook-format-your-kindle-fire-
hdx-0156913/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
 155. See, e.g., Derrick Schultz, How to Convert Your ePub to a Kindle Format, 
EPUBSECRETS (Apr. 13, 2014), http://epubsecrets.com/convert-epub-to-kindle-mobi-format.php 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2016); How to Read ePubs on Kindle Fire, WIKIHOW, 
http://www.wikihow.com/Read-ePubs-on-Kindle-Fire (last visited Apr. 4, 2016). 
 
444 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
Finally, the plight of the authors is not difficult to understand. As 
noted previously, authors’ groups have urged antitrust inquiries into 
eBook pricing, particularly by Amazon. For the most part, these authors 
presumably have royalty agreements predicated on a percentage of the 
sales price, typically in the range of 10% to 20% of the wholesale price.156 
Because eBook technology drives variable costs down dramatically, 
prices have dropped dramatically as well. So authors are not being injured 
because fewer of their books are sold; to the contrary, sales are almost 
certainly higher.157 Rather, their injury results from the fact that per-copy 
prices are so much lower. This is not an antitrust problem, however, but 
rather one in contract drafting. Most particularly, contracts that were 
drafted before eBooks were prominently on the scene are now “obsolete,” 
in the sense that they provide too little compensation to authors. For 
example, if authors’ royalties were a flat rate per copy rather than a 
percentage of per-unit prices authors would be better rather than worse 
off. In the long run, one can expect that authors will in fact be better off. 
Volume will be higher and there will be fewer production costs to be 
shared between publishers and authors. The biggest losers will be 
traditional intermediaries such as bookstores. 
These gains and losses are nothing other than the typical adjustments 
to technological change, which benefit some market participants while 
injuring others, and in the process can cause painful changes. But authors 
very likely have no more of an antitrust claim than gasoline stations will 
have when the world switches to electric cars, or blacksmiths had when 
it moved away from horse-drawn modes of transportation. 
The Second Circuit decision to apply the per se rule158 and condemn 
Apple’s solicitation of the publishers to collude against Amazon seems 
correct on legal grounds and almost certainly correct on policy grounds 
as well. To permit the publishers’ price fixing and boycott agreement 
would have slowed up the industry’s movement into a new equilibrium 
in which ebooks have a stable position. 
As a matter of antitrust law, Apple’s solicitation was a “naked” 
restraint, which is one whose success depends on power over price, or the 
exercise of market power.159 In this case the publishers’ cartel against 
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Amazon could succeed only by forcing Amazon to raise eBook prices. 
Naked restraints are ordinarily governed by antitrust’s per se rule, which 
does not require proof of market power. In this case the fact of the 
successful restraint itself established power. 
A dissenter on the Second Circuit panel did not dispute the facts, but 
protested160 that application of the per se rule seemed inconsistent with 
dicta in the Supreme Court’s decision in Leegin Creatives Leather 
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., where the Court wrote: 
A group of retailers might collude to fix prices to consumers 
and then compel a manufacturer to aid the unlawful 
arrangement with resale price maintenance. In that instance 
the manufacturer does not establish the practice to stimulate 
services or to promote its brand but to give inefficient 
retailers higher profits. Retailers with better distribution 
systems and lower cost structures would be prevented from 
charging lower prices by the agreement. . . . 
A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or 
competing retailers that decreases output or reduces 
competition in order to increase price is, and ought to be, per 
se unlawful. To the extent a vertical agreement setting 
minimum resale prices is entered upon to facilitate either 
type of cartel, it, too, would need to be held unlawful under 
the rule of reason.161 
These dicta162 apparently contemplated a situation in which a pre-
existing cartel compelled a manufacturer to participate by imposing RPM 
as a cartel-enforcement device. Such a cartel would be contrary to the 
manufacturer’s independent interest because the manufacturer would be 
best served by a competitive downstream market. Rather, it agrees to 
RPM as a condition of keeping the cartelists’ business. 
This situation is quite different from the one in Apple, however, where 
Apple actually induced the publishers to agree among themselves to 
impose higher prices on a different firm that was vertically related to the 
publishers but competed with Apple, namely, Amazon.163 That restraint 
was intended to facilitate Apple’s entry into the eBook market, but its 
efficacy depended on its success in forcing Amazon to charge higher 
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prices.164 As such its profitability depended on its ability to effect a price 
increase and is thus a naked restraint that operated horizontally to protect 
Apple from Amazon’s lower prices. The Supreme Court noted this 
difference in its NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc. decision,165 which observed 
that the per se rule was properly applied to a vertically related firm in 
Klor’s, where a single retailer allegedly orchestrated a conspiracy among 
major appliance manufacturers to boycott a store that competed with the 
retailer.166 The per se rule was apt in that case because the manufacturer 
was allegedly soliciting the cartel of manufacturers to boycott Klor’s, just 
as Apple solicited a cartel of book publishers to force Amazon to raise its 
prices.167 
IV.  NET NEUTRALITY 
The term “net neutrality” can mean many things. For some people, 
“neutrality” means charging all users the same periodic price, such as 
forty dollars per month, regardless of their consumption and the speed 
they use. For others, it means charging users in proportion to how much 
they use, requiring higher volume or higher speed users to pay more. 
Some look at whether different content suppliers, as opposed to viewers, 
can obtain more bandwidth, and thus higher speeds for a given amount of 
content, by paying more. Others consider whether certain providers are 
facing discrimination or are excluded altogether for either economic or 
noneconomic reasons.168 Net neutrality can also refer more generally to 
guarantees of a certain minimum quality of service for all users.169 The 
questions are further complicated because internet access is a two-sided 
market in which internet service providers (ISPs) derive revenue from 
both consumers and content providers.170 
Net neutrality is not exclusively nor even predominantly an antitrust 
problem. Antitrust may become relevant when vertical integration by 
ISPs leads to exclusion of or discrimination against competing 
downstream content. In the United States, these practices violate the 
antitrust laws only infrequently, although they are certainly relevant in 
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merger cases171 and potentially relevant to the law of exclusionary 
practices, tying arrangements, or exclusive contracting. EU law sweeps 
more broadly, and the European Parliament has recently imposed 
significant limitations on the power of providers to discriminate among 
types of offerings.172 
Net neutrality concerns can become more prominent when old 
technology firms such as cable companies attempt to protect their 
position by restraining the development of newer technologies like 
internet broadband.173 Very likely the biggest long-term concern favoring 
government protection of net neutrality is threatened restraints on 
innovation. 
One issue that dominates the larger debate over net neutrality is that 
the Internet has for all practical purposes become a public highway, 
reaching deep into people’s daily lives. As a result, concerns analogous 
to the “universal service” mandates of public utility policy cannot be 
ignored, and these may justify protecting or occasionally even 
subsidizing certain portions of the market.174 Fundamentally, however, 
these are not antitrust concerns, and antitrust law does not have good tools 
for addressing them. To the extent that they are important, a case exists 
for government regulation of access and prices that goes beyond antitrust. 
The discussion here is limited to antitrust policy, which focuses on 
competitive concerns that might result from lack of net neutrality. As an 
antitrust matter, the concern over internet distribution is with maintaining 
competition, which means a state of affairs that maximizes overall output 
and does not unreasonably exclude either ISPs or content providers.175 
That is, in the absence of horizontal collusion, the antitrust problem is 
fundamentally about bottlenecks. 
U.S. antitrust law properly sees competitive problems when a 
vertically integrated firm excludes programming that competes with its 
own assets. For instance, the ISP Comcast Cable is also the owner of 
NBC, a large distributor of programming, including movies. If Comcast 
attempted to reduce competition with NBC by placing limits on Netflix, 
a major competing streamer of movies and television programming, that 
could certainly raise antitrust issues. Such problems are usually handled 
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preemptively under the law of vertical mergers or, if there is no 
contemplated merger, as exclusive contracting or refusal to deal.176 The 
problems are most serious when a market contains a dominant ISP. 
Pricing is a different matter. Pricing alone does not frequently present 
an antitrust problem unless a dominant vertically integrated firm prices 
in a way that favors its own assets and reasonable alternatives are 
unavailable. First of all, per-unit pricing is typical in similar technologies 
such as telephony, electricity, natural gas, and the like. Second, price 
discrimination that is unrelated to the exclusion of a competitor typically 
increases total output, is usually efficient, and is a virtually inherent 
feature in public utility policy.177 As a result, differential pricing to either 
users or content providers rarely raises antitrust issues unless the firm 
designs pricing so as to exclude a rival or limit its competitive 
effectiveness. Society may wish to mandate a particular price 
discrimination rule to increase output or meet an articulated universal 
service obligation, but this would not be an antitrust rule. 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has classified the 
Internet as a common carrier, giving the FCC a set of regulatory powers 
analogous to those that apply to telephone services.178 The FCC has also 
promulgated a set of net neutrality rules whose principal thrust is to 
prohibit blocking or the creation of “fast” lanes favoring some content 
over others.179 The introduction of these rules has produced a great deal 
of overheated rhetoric, including silly claims such as Verizon’s claim that 
such regulation is uncalled for because it is based on the 1934 
Communications Act and applies regulation approaches designed for the 
“steam locomotive and the telegraph.”180 The fact is that the 
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Communications Act, like many federal regulatory provisions, has been 
amended many times. The appropriate conception of common carrier 
regulation today is far, far different from the 1934 conception, including 
a much lighter regulatory touch and increased room for antitrust law as 
an alternative.181 
Antitrust may have a more important role to play when older 
technologies that have an entrenched position confront new technologies, 
including internet technologies. The concerns have been raised with 
respect to ultimately unsuccessful proposed mergers between Comcast 
Cable and Time-Warner Cable, as well as the successful merger between 
AT&T and DirecTV, a satellite provider.182 These proposed mergers 
involve both old technology cable companies and relatively new 
technology ISPs. Internet “on demand” programming is increasingly 
displacing traditional hard-wired cable television delivered with 
scheduled programs.183 The switch away from cable is particularly 
prominent among younger viewers.184 The market is currently in flux and 
non-cable alternatives are increasing rapidly. In January 2015, ESPN and 
Dish Network announced a standalone internet streaming service that will 
permit people with broadband to receive channels on the Internet 
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directly.185 This move will almost certainly hasten the migration away 
from traditional cable toward internet-based television services.186 
Others, including Sony, HBO, and Apple, have already announced entry 
in more limited ways or are contemplating it.187 At this writing, the FCC 
has proposed de-linking of cable set-top boxes from cable service. De-
linking will enable the use of “generic” tuner boxes that can serve to make 
cable video more readily interchangeable, and thus competitive, with 
non-cable video.188 
Cable companies have not only been laggards in internet service 
development, but they have also resisted internet alternatives at both the 
program-content and service-provision levels, in the process restraining 
innovation significantly. The rationale is not difficult to discern: the 
Internet is, or can be, both more efficient and more competitive than cable 
technology. The fear, expressed in Netflix’s forceful opposition to the 
Comcast merger,189 is that cable television companies will either cap 
internet bandwidth or price it out in a way that makes Netflix and other 
internet content streamers more costly.190 The issue is complex, however. 
On the one hand, cable companies may not obtain as much revenue from 
internet data streaming as they do from carrying programs themselves. 
On the other hand, consumers typically pay an extra fee for their internet 
access anyway, and sometimes this fee is quite large in relation to the 
bandwidth that they obtain.191 
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The other significant competitive threat is upstream, in the internet 
service provision market. In the United States, several cable companies 
offer broadband internet services, but they have resisted the deployment 
of greater bandwidth.192 Google, AT&T, and several smaller firms are 
now installing ultra-high-speed Internet in many communities.193 
However, this Internet is typically not tied to a cable television company 
at all, although it may be bundled with satellite television. 
The upstream situation is somewhat precarious for cable companies 
because the range and robustness of alternatives is growing larger. 
Depending on available alternatives, viewers faced with limitations on 
internet speed or access offered by a cable company may simply drop 
cable altogether and make a different deal for internet service 
provision.194 Nevertheless, large cable companies continue to have a 
dominant market share in many areas,195 and they can be expected to 
resist the fastest and least restricted internet options as long as these large 
cable companies challenge traditional cable profits. At the same time, 
however, the business model of the cable companies can be expected to 
change.196 How quickly that happens depends on the extent of 
competition.  
In any event, regulatory alternatives other than antitrust are better 
suited to addressing most of these problems. As far as antitrust is 
concerned, even a monopolist can generally charge any price or regulate 
the quality of its output, provided that it does so unilaterally and does not 
unreasonably exclude rivals. While cable companies may be holding back 
on internet speed, that is not an antitrust violation in and of itself. 
Exclusionary practices directed at competitors can be, however. Further, 
a merger between a cable television provider and an existing broadband 
company could prove anticompetitive if it threatened to restrain 
innovation in the broadband market. Additionally, holding back on 
otherwise available higher speeds could certainly qualify, provided that 
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other market conditions for competitive harm were present. The 2010 
Federal Horizontal Merger Guidelines discuss such possibilities in a 
section covering mergers that limit “Innovation and Product Variety.”197 
One of the more harmful sets of regulatory initiatives, rarely reflecting 
anything more than special interest capture, is efforts at both the federal 
and state levels to prevent municipalities from creating or expanding their 
own broadband services by contracting with third parties such as Google 
for installation.198 The anti-municipal expansion program gained political 
momentum in 2004 when the Supreme Court held that federal law did not 
preempt state statutes that limited the power of municipalities to develop 
their own telecommunications services.199 The result was accelerated 
efforts by cable and existing telephone companies to campaign to state 
legislatures for such statutes, and approximately twenty states have 
passed them.200 
The general thrust of these statutes is to prohibit municipalities from 
taking greater technological advantage of what the Internet has to offer in 
situations where existing ISPs have been laggards.201 These municipally 
contracted networks are largely, although not entirely, independent of 
content.202 As a result, they do not have a significant incentive to 
discriminate against or otherwise hinder competing programing. The 
municipal systems can also provide collateral services such as free Wi-Fi 
in designated downtown areas, city parks, public libraries, other public 
buildings, and even subways and buses.203 At the same time, it is not 
difficult to see why major cable companies have launched a fierce 
lobbying campaign against the expansion of municipal broadband. First 
of all, the addition of a municipal alternative increases broadband 
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competition.204 Second, because they are not affiliated with cable 
companies or content providers, the municipal companies lack the 
incentives that have distorted or hindered broadband development.205 
To be sure, municipal overinvestment or under-delivery can be a 
problem.206 Further, overly subsidized municipal broadband may 
compete unfairly with existing broadband suppliers.207 This is most likely 
to be a problem when the broadband market in an area is competitive to 
begin with. Municipalities compete with private enterprise all the time in 
the provision of parking, local transportation, waste disposal, firefighting, 
electricity, and even education and hospitals.208 One important difference 
between many of these services is that, unlike broadband, they are much 
more likely to be competitively provided to begin with, reducing the need 
for a municipal market entrant. In any event, to the extent these problems 
exist, legislation requiring municipal broadband projects to be fiscally 
responsible is the better away to address them. The benefits of increased 
broadband entry by non-vertically integrated suppliers of any kind, 
including municipal, certainly outweigh costs. 
Here again, antitrust’s role is limited. As a general proposition, the 
source of the restraint is legislative. As the Supreme Court has recently 
re-emphasized, even state legislation can be subject to antitrust scrutiny 
when it gives too much authority to interested market participants whom 
a public official inadequately supervised209 or when it fails to authorize 
specific anticompetitive acts.210 By and large, however, absolute 
prohibitions passed by state legislation do not fall into these categories. 
Rather, combatting anticompetitive efforts to restrain municipal internet 
provision falls more clearly into the FCC’s mandate to further the public 
interest in internet development, which in this case should preempt 
practices that restrain either output or innovation. 
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V.  ANTITRUST AND PATENTS IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES 
Today, many view the patent system as not working. Common 
criticisms are that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issues far too 
many patents and that discerning patent validity and scope is extremely 
costly and produces uncertain results.211 These critiques are hardly new, 
and even Supreme Court Justices asserted some of them more than a 
century ago.212 The concerns are not evenly arrayed across all industries, 
however. In some markets, such as chemical production and pioneer 
pharmaceuticals, the patent system works relatively well.213 In others, 
including electronics, software, and most information technologies, it 
works very poorly.214 
In information technologies, the more controversial patent and 
competition issues concern standard setting, FRAND royalty obligations, 
the right to an injunction on FRAND-encumbered patents,215 software 
and business method patents, as well as issues related to cross-licensing 
or package licensing. These issues often arise in technologies relating to 
the creation, formatting, dissemination, and consumption of digital 
information. One important reason is the crucial importance of 
networking in information technologies, which demands interoperability, 
and thus technological compatibility, among the devices and programs of 
different competitors. 
The extent to which antitrust law should address these problems in 
addition to or instead of patent law has been controversial. To begin with, 
it is not the purpose of antitrust law to repair defects in other federal 
government regulatory systems, including the patent system.216 For most 
abuses, the patent system itself is quite capable of keeping its house in 
order. The Patent Act governs all questions about patent validity, scope, 
and infringement, as well as most questions about improper litigation 
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conduct.217 Questions about entitlement to an injunction for patent 
infringement or the mechanism for computing royalties are also 
fundamentally about patent law or even contract law, not antitrust.218 
On the other hand, the patent system does not have satisfactory tools 
for permitting consumer or end-user challenges to harmful patent 
practices. Infringement defendants, who are almost always producers, 
can litigate questions about patent validity and scope as well as 
overclaiming or litigation misconduct, and they do so all the time. 
Nothing in the Patent Act, however, gives consumers a general right to 
challenge such practices. When consumers do obtain such rights, it is 
most typically under antitrust laws, which permit consumers to challenge 
anticompetitive practices that raise prices or reduce product quality.219 
For example, while only patent infringement defendants can challenge 
improper infringement actions directly under the Patent Act—then only 
by a defense, counterclaim, or request for attorney’s fees—consumers 
can bring an action under antitrust laws for improper infringement actions 
that result in monopoly and higher prices.220 
What makes the consumer-action feature of antitrust law particularly 
important is that consumer welfare is just as central to good IP policy as 
to good competition policy. Consumers consistently benefit from 
innovation that reduces costs or improves product or service quality.221 
As a result, they are the optimal surrogates for patent efficiency. The story 
for producers is more ambiguous. Producers certainly benefit from their 
own innovation as well from complementary innovations that they can 
procure from others. However, they can also benefit from practices that 
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restrain the competing innovations of other firms or that permit them to 
profit from the assertion of legal rights that confer no social benefit 
whatsoever.222 In sum, consumers are inherently better plaintiffs for 
enforcing IP rights, just as they are for enforcing antitrust law. No good 
institutional mechanism for consumer involvement exists in IP law. 
Another advantage of antitrust policy for evaluating patent practices 
is its economic, ex ante approach to decision-making. In a welcome 
development, the Supreme Court’s 2013 Actavis decision recognized that 
courts can address some restraints of trade governing patents without 
addressing issues of patent validity or scope.223 Antitrust’s economic 
approach to restraints creates appropriate incentives by relying on 
rational expectations about consequences to guide people’s behavior at 
the time they contemplate it.224 Thus, the antitrust consequences of a 
settlement should be based on what the parties reasonably believed about 
patent validity and infringement at the time they entered into their 
settlement225 and on objective indicators about competitive effects. To be 
useful policy, policy makers must attach incentives to behavior at the time 
the parties contemplate the behavior. 
When it comes to assessing the competitive effects of patent practices, 
antitrust law has some distinct comparative advantages over patent law. 
Industrial economists have been studying the effects of industry practices 
on output and competitiveness for decades. By contrast, neither economic 
scholarship nor congressional or other government fact-finding has 
produced much useful information about how patent issuance, duration, 
scope, or enforcement affect economic welfare. In that state of affairs, it 
is hardly clear that competition policy should be yielding much territory 
to patent policy.226 
A.  Standard Setting and FRAND Encumbered Patents 
“FRAND” refers to a patentee’s contract or contract-like obligation to 
license one or more of its patents on “fair, reasonable and 
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nondiscriminatory” terms.227 Such agreements most generally arise in the 
context of standard-setting organizations (SSOs), particularly in 
industries such as digital video technology or cellular phones,228 where 
compatibility and the ability to interconnect are essential. An SSO is 
typically created to identify and adopt standards for technology in such 
industries that enable the devices of various manufacturers to function on 
a single network.229 A multi-producer market such as the ones for cellular 
phones or digital video could not exist without such standards.230 
Frequently, an SSO will have several choices of technologies to 
address a particular problem or provide a new feature to the community 
of producers adopting its standards. At that point, the SSO may ask the 
owners of these technologies to “bid” for the right to have their 
technology adopted as a standard.231 Part of this bid is a FRAND 
commitment. This means that the technology owner agrees in advance 
that if its technology is adopted as the standard, it will license the 
technology to all users on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 
terms.232 Once the technology is selected, two things happen. First, the 
chosen technology becomes much more valuable in the marketplace. 
Prior to selection, the technology was perhaps one of many options and 
had to vie with others, perhaps even unpatented public domain 
alternatives. Once selection occurs, however, all manufacturers on the 
network that want to take advantage of that technology will use the one 
that has been selected. By contrast, unselected technologies generally 
become less valuable. Some may even become worthless, particularly if 
they were dedicated to a single use for which there is no longer a market. 
As a result, rejection of a particular technology has produced some 
antitrust challenges by disappointed owners.233 
The winning patents that constitute the selected technology (now 
called “standard-essential patents” or SEPs) become “FRAND-
encumbered,” which means that anyone can license them on FRAND 
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terms234 The meaning of FRAND encumbrance has led to several 
litigation issues, a few of which are relevant to competition policy. One 
has to do with whether the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent is 
entitled to obtain an injunction against a user or, relatedly, the 
circumstances under which such an injunction is appropriate.235 The 
second has to do with how a fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 
royalty obligation is computed.236 
U.S. law generally limits antitrust to a fairly restricted domain. 
Therefore, most courts view these problems as presenting issues of patent 
law or sometimes contract law, not antitrust law. This includes questions 
about whether the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent is entitled to 
an injunction. The principal exception permitting application of antitrust 
law in U.S. courts is for firms that make legal claims that are so poorly 
founded that the firms have no reasonable expectation of winning.237 But 
most claims for an injunction on a FRAND-encumbered patent have not 
fallen into this category. In 2014, a decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit split three ways on this issue,238 indicating that any 
of three different positions on it is reasonable. Judge Randall Rader, at 
that time the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, wrote in dissent that the 
owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent should be able to obtain an 
injunction on the same terms as any other patentee.239 Most of the 
important decisions, such as eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C.,240 which 
rejected the rule of virtually automatic injunctions against patent 
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infringers,241 and the recent round of FRAND cases,242 are not antitrust 
cases at all. 
This does not mean that antitrust can never have a role. First of all, a 
lawsuit in conflict with the plaintiff’s own contractual obligations could 
be improper, and to that extent could result in antitrust liability. The Ninth 
Circuit made that clear in its Apple v. Motorola decision, citing several 
cases.243 That fact does not necessarily mean, however, that antitrust is 
the best vehicle for pursuing such claims. While filing of a baseless, 
exclusionary lawsuit satisfies the conduct element of a monopolization 
offense, liability also requires proof of monopoly power or a dangerous 
probability of achieving it. The Patent Act’s own remedial measures such 
as the “exceptional case” provision, would provide a more direct route to 
relief, although not treble damages.244 Of course, the contractual 
obligations to license on FRAND terms would have to be sufficiently 
clear. 
One might imagine a conspiracy among owners of FRAND-
encumbered patents to deny relief, or a conspiracy among producers to 
deny a firm’s application for a standard in order to protect their own 
technologies.245 But fundamental questions about the meaning and scope 
of FRAND status is a question of patent law, not of antitrust. By contrast, 
EU competition law reaches further. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union has held that the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent may 
abuse its dominant position unlawfully under Article 102 when it requests 
an injunction as a way of forcing a royalty agreement.246 
B.  Patent Pooling and Related Technology Sharing 
In patent law, a “pool” refers to a situation in which two or more firms 
share a technology via common licensing.247 For example, if two 
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television manufacturers each own some patents that give their own 
televisions desirable features, they may cross-license, thus enabling both 
manufacturers to share these features.248 Such sharing generally improves 
consumer welfare to the extent that the features are desirable and can be 
distributed across the entire market.249 Because patents are non-rivalrous, 
desirable features can be duplicated an infinite number of times. If the 
two firms have patent portfolios of roughly equal value, then the cross-
licensing might be royalty free; if not, then one firm may pay the other a 
royalty.250  
The firms may also agree about whether to license their shared 
technology to outside firms. Some pools are composed entirely of patent 
portfolio owners who share their technology with one another. Often, 
however, a large pool will have both “licensor members,” who 
manufacture and submit their patents to the pool for licensing, and 
“licensee members,” who manufacture one or more products but do not 
have patents of their own to license to the pool. A good example of such 
a large pool is MPEG-LA, which has collected thousands of patents 
related to digital video technology and freely licenses them to 
outsiders.251 
Our understanding of the economic rationale for and competitive 
effects of patent pools has evolved considerably. Today it seems clear 
that the rationales for pooling in networked information intensive 
technologies are different from the rationales in more traditional 
technologies. In a technologically simpler time, the most common 
explanations were that pools were procompetitive if the patents in the 
pool were complements to one another but that they were likely to be 
anticompetitive when patents competed.252 When two things are 
complements, such as hardware and software, they are efficiently used 
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together. By contrast, a user selects one among several competing 
products. At the atmospheric level, this view of patent pools makes 
economic sense. For example, if a manufacturer of digital memory 
devices and another manufacturer of digital displays should pool their 
patents, each might more efficiently be able to produce a device such as 
a laptop computer that included both memory and a display. On the other 
hand, if two patentees of duplicate technology should pool, the rationale 
is more likely to be price fixing.253 A licensee would need technology 
from one of them but not both, and the pool may serve as a price 
agreement device. 
This rationale fails to explain the phenomenon of the widespread 
pooling of complex digital technologies. Several other characteristics of 
these markets must be considered as well. First, information technology 
patents are frequently complex and involve many claims. As a result, they 
often function as both market substitutes and complements, making this 
distinction less defensible.254 A good illustration is the Federal Circuit’s 
2010 Princo Corp. v. International Trade Commission255 decision. The 
pooling in that case involved rewritable DVDs, and the problem in 
controversy involved patented technologies for locating the electronic 
“stylus” in such a way that it could begin recording precisely where it left 
off in a previous recording session.256 One firm had developed and 
patented an analog technology for solving this problem, while the other 
had developed a digital alternative.257 Critics regarded the digital 
technology as technologically superior, but it was also less stable and 
somewhat buggy.258 As a result, manufacturers preferred the analog 
technology for the time being. In the devices, the two technologies 
functioned as substitutes rather than complements. A manufacturer would 
ordinarily require one or the other but not both. In Princo, however, 
practicing the analog technology required infringement of at least one 
claim in the digital patent as well.259 In sum, even though the two 
technologies appeared to be substitutes in the product market, the patents 
functioned as legal complements to the extent that a firm wishing to use 
the analog technology had to obtain a license for both. 
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The complement–substitute distinction is not a particularly strong 
explanation for pooling in complex information technology markets. 
Indeed, a large pool such as MPEG-LA contains thousands of patents 
whose functional relationship to one another is as both complements and 
substitutes, as well as many patents whose precise scope has never been 
determined.260 
Further, the question of whether patents operate as substitutes, 
complements, or neither can be quite specific to the particular licensee. 
To illustrate, the patents in the MPEG-LA pool relate to digital video 
technology that operates under a common standard.261 The devices that 
employ this technology include generators of digital video content, such 
as cameras and video cameras. But they also include devices that accept 
digital content generated elsewhere and process it, including displays, 
storage devices, compilers, editors, and the like. The users also include 
software that reads and processes digital video content while neither 
producing nor displaying it. A device such as a smartphone might 
perform several or even all of these functions, while a device such as a 
computer monitor (display only) or camera (generation only) performs 
only a few. 
In such markets, the distinction between complementary and 
substitute patents is largely meaningless. Rather, pooling functions as a 
mechanism for managing communal ownership when sharing property 
rights is less costly and more effective than defending individual 
boundaries.262 That is to say, the modern digital pool operates more like 
a common pool resource frequently used in old-fashioned markets such 
as fisheries, livestock grazing, or irrigation.263 
Why might the several rights owners of a fishing lake “pool” their 
rights, giving each member access to all, rather than attempting to divide 
the lake into individual sectors permitting each one to appropriate its own 
investment? First, identifying, setting, and defending boundaries can be 
very costly. Second, dividing the territory in this way could be 
devastating to the yield. 
On the first issue, information technology patents are often 
characterized by ambiguous claim drafting that makes interpretation 
costly, often on the order of several thousand dollars per patent, and in 
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situations where often dozens or even hundreds of patents are in issue.264 
By simply cross-licensing their portfolios or licensing them in the 
aggregate to manufacturing licensees, the firms can eliminate most of the 
costly problems that accompany individual patent interpretation.265 Once 
they have licensed out everything they own, they have no motive for 
ascertaining which of their many patents a licensee might be using. This 
is simply a special, although perhaps not widely appreciated, application 
of Ronald Coase’s well-known article, The Nature of the Firm.266 Coase 
argued that the firm’s continuous comparison of the costs of doing 
something for itself against those of using the market determine the 
boundaries of a firm.267 In this case, the cost of maintaining individual 
boundaries exceeds the cost of sharing and then managing the shared 
resources. A firm that is intent on maximizing its profits will choose the 
marginally less costly alternative. 
Patent pools in digital technologies have raised some antitrust 
problems, although surprisingly few given the amount of power that the 
larger pools have. Price-fixing or express output-limitation agreements in 
product markets could certainly provoke antitrust challenges, but such 
restrictions are uncommon.268 One important difference between 
traditional common pool resources and patent pools is that the resources 
in a traditional commons, such as a fishery, are rivalrous or 
“subtractive.”269 That is, each member’s use reduces the amount left over 
for others.270 Further, overuse is an important problem given that 
individual members do not bear the full cost of resource development. 
For example, overfishing in fishery commons is to be expected because 
each member has an incentive to put in as little as possible while taking 
out as much as possible. For this reason, catch or related use limitations 
will almost certainly be necessary.271 There is nothing suspicious about 
an agreement among ten members of a fishery commons to limit each 
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person’s catch to, say, 100 fish per week.272 
In contrast, IP rights are non-rivalrous. One person’s use of a patent 
does nothing to diminish the quantity left over. As a result, jointly agreed 
output limitations by the members of a patent pool are inherently more 
suspicious and should be reviewed for the possibility of price fixing.273 
Most of the antitrust challenges to patent pools in information 
technologies have not involved price fixing but rather tying or equivalent 
claims. For example, the licensee from a large patent pool might 
complain about being required to take the entire pool of, say, 1200 patents 
when it believes that its own product infringes no more than a small 
fraction of that number. For example, Nero AG, an unsuccessful 
challenger to the MPEG pool, is a software company whose products 
customers use for photo and video editing but not for creating new 
content or displaying it.274 Claims such as Nero’s made some sense in a 
time when the substitutes–complements distinction was the ruling 
rationale for pooling. By stating that a particular patent was not wanted, 
the licensee was in fact asserting that this particular patent was not a 
complementary technology insofar as the licensee’s own production was 
concerned. If it were, the licensee would presumably want it. 
But the substitute–complement distinction rarely serves to justify the 
existence of large patent pools in information technologies. The more 
central problem is the cost of determining the scope of each patent as well 
as of examining the licensee’s products and determining which of the 
pool’s many patents the devices infringe. Those costs could easily exceed 
the costs of the licensing agreement itself, which is of course why the 
patents were licensed in this fashion in the first place. Indeed, when 
extended over the entire range of licensees, the cost of examining all of 
the patents and determining which ones every licensee’s products 
infringed would be heroic. If doing this were efficient, pooling would not 
be expected to exist in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
Digital and other information technologies have presented public and 
private antitrust plaintiffs with daunting challenges. These include the 
assessment of market power as well as understanding both unilateral and 
collaborative activity. In the process, the case law and literature have both 
understated and exaggerated competitive problems. 
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There is little reason for thinking that competition cannot work in 
most markets involving digital and other information technologies. 
Nevertheless, effective policy design requires careful thought. The trick 
is to keep the channels open for new entry, resource movement, and 
consumer choice—things that antitrust policy is capable of doing well. IP 
rights must be respected, but too often they hinder rather than facilitate 
the free flow of information. Antitrust and the competition economics 
that guide it have the advantage of good empirical tools and a rich dataset, 
as well as judicially directed policy goals that are aligned with the 
consumer welfare interests in both competition and innovation. At the 
same time, however, antitrust’s domain is limited. First, it requires more 
than a practice that simply reduces economic welfare. There must also be 
harm to competition. Finally, courts never intended antitrust to be a tool 
for policing the behavior of other federal regulatory regimes, although it 
does have some limited power to police insufficiently transparent 
regulation imposed by the states. 
  

